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BUILDING SOUND FINANCE IN CROATIA  






The main aim of this paper is to point out that warranted 
transformation in transitional economies in not possible without firstly, 
stabilizing the economy and secondly implementing bold financial 
reforms. Building sound finance in an emerging market economy is not 
an easy task indeed. The role of a sound financial system is to mobilize 
funds and allocate the capital efficiently. Therefore sound financial 
intermediation is crucial for transition. The paper has three main parts. 
They are: a) transformation (including a brief description of the 
economic structure) b) present situation including stabilization and 
financial reforms in the Croatian economy, and c) future prospects and 
possible problems that lie ahead. 
 
Some of Croatia's problem are common in other transitional economies. 
For example, it is generally accepted that economies in transformation 
need substantial reforms and restructuring. Financial sector always 
plays a very important role in those reforms (see: Caprio and Levine, 
1994, Saunders and Sommariva, 1993 or Vittas, 1993). Without 
efficient financial intermediation structural changes cannot take place, 
or they will be much slower than warranted. 
 
Transitional economies are often faced with high inflation. 
Transformation process usually starts with price liberalization. 
Combined with a substantial fall in production, or generally speaking 
with huge macroeconomic imbalances, price liberalization and 
continued lack of financial discipline commonly results in high inflation. 
Therefore, inflation has been one of the main consequences of initial 
economic changes in former socialist countries on their path to market 
oriented   systems.   Needless  to  say,  within  the  framework  of  high 
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inflation and rapidly changing relative prices (see: Sonje, 1993) efficient 
allocation of resources in not possible. So, macroimbalances have to be 
addressed as soon as possible and sound foundations made for future 
restructuring. 
 
But, stabilization of the economy is not a sufficient condition for 
successful reforms. Five years after the fall of the Berlin wall, optimism 
that has swept across formerly planned economies in the late eighties 
(due to dramatic political changes) is loosing ground and pessimism 
seem to be the prevalent mood in most of economies in transformation. 
In some of those countries we observe the return of former communist 
politicians into power. 
 
Why? The recession has proved much deeper than anyone expected 
(see Kornai 1993a, or Bićanić and Škreb, 1992). A long and continuous 
fall in production is causing very serious damage to the economy and 
society as a whole, leading to: falling living standards, very poor health 
services, low quality education and infrastructure. It is important to 
point out that none of those problems can be worked out with 
redistribution. Only a growing economy can slowly, but surely resolve 
this problem. On top of this, economic inequalities seem to be on the 
rise. The emergence of "instant new capitalists" and their conspicuous 
consumption is causing frustration among impoverished population. If 
the "production problem" is not settled soon, this could lead to serious 
political and social unrest in those countries eventually leading to 
Weimarization (Kornai, 1993a). 
 
Therefore it is clear that the main task in transitional economies should 
be to increase production. But, of course, not the same structure of the 
economy that caused huge macroeconomic imbalances. Restructuring 
the real and financial sector is a difficult task, indeed. At the same time, 
inflation should be kept at moderate levels, balance of payments should 
be under control and unemployment (with social safety net) closely 
scrutinized not to endanger the transition process. In short, these 
countries are faced with truly formidable challenges. 
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2. Transformation Process 
 
2.1. Real sector developments 
 
Following its independence, Croatia was and still is confronted with 
serious economic troubles caused by: a) aggression and occupation of 
parts of its territory, b) transformation from socialist economic system 
to a market oriented one and c) disintegration of former Yugoslav 
market (see for example: Škreb and Bićanić (1994) and Bićanić and 
Škreb (1994)). It has to be kept in mind that eighties were a period of 
a long lasting recession. GDP in 1993 was estimated to about US $ 12 
billion. Therefore it is of no surprise that cumulative fall in Croatia's 
GDP in the period from 1991-1993 has been estimated at about one 
third. The economy was, till October 1993, faced with hyperinflation. 
 
War damages alone are estimated at more than US $ 15 billion. 
 
Unemployment rate throughout 1994 was at a level of about 17%. The 
rate has been stable in the last year. Number of unemployed persons is 
about 250 thousands. Unfortunately, there are no reliable data on the 
overall employment. It seems safe to assume that employment in the 
private sector is much higher than shown in statistics. Unregistered 
economy represents probably more than one third of the overall 
registered production and employment. 
 
Balance of Payment data for 1993 and the first nine month of 1994 look 
very encouraging. Croatia had a current account surplus, capital 
account surplus and has increased its international reserves. Croatian 
economy has been traditionally service-oriented and a trade deficit is 
easily covered with other items in current account. 
 
A large number of refugees and displaced persons (in mid-1994 about 
500 thousands) remain to be a heavy burden for the economy and 




But, one of the basic elements of genuine restructuring is to change 
incentives of managers in enterprises. Within this framework clear 
ownership rights and predominantly private ownership are needed for 
the increase in the efficiency of management. 
 
2.2. Transformation of Ownership and Privatization 
 
Croatia has a unique privatization model. It is envisaged to proceed in 
two steps. Its first step was to transform ill defined concept of social 
ownership (which existed under the socialist self-managed economic 
system) into known forms of ownership, either private or state. The 
second step is to privatize parts of state ownership. 
 
Under the initial stage of ownership transformation former socially 
owned companies (actually former selfmanagers - workers) could apply 
to the Croatian Privatization Fund to buy part, up to 50%, of company's 
shares under very favorable conditions (hefty discounts and deferred 
payments of shares). 
 
Nonprivatized shares of firms and shares of firms that did not apply for 
own privatization scheme till June 1992 (deadline for submission of 
autonomous privatization to CPF) were transferred to the portfolio of 
the Croatian Privatization Fund (CPF) and (smaller parts) to Pension 
and Health Funds. 
 
Before the transformation of ownership begun (in April 1991) there 
were 3500 socially owned companies. At the end of April 1994 out of 
2877 requests for autonomous privatization by enterprises themselves, 
85% have been approved. The difference between the total number of 
companies which should have undergone transformation of ownership 
(about 3500) and the number of requests for autonomous privatization 
(2877) is due to an estimated number of 500 firms in Serb-rebel 
controlled areas (occupied parts of Croatia) and firms that did not 
submit their privatization plans by the deadline (June 1992). Ownership 
transformation  has  been  completed  in  about 2200 enterprises. Their 
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total equity capital value is DEM 20 billion. Out of 2200 enterprises 
whose ownership structure has been transformed 48% have been 
totally privatized, 36% are mostly in private ownership and 16% are 
mostly in the hands of the CPF. It is interesting to point out that totally 
privatized companies are much smaller with the average value of DEM 
1,7 million, than companies that are mostly still in the hands of CPF and 
funds. Their average value is DEM 23,9 million. 
 
The CPF is offering shares from its portfolio on the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange in the hope to sell them on the market. It has to be pointed 
out that enterprises that are not privatized more than 50% remain 
under control of the CPF. Until the end of April 1994 total revenue from 
privatization was DEM 858 million, which is less than expected. 
 
3. Stabilization and Financial Reforms in Croatia 
 
3.1. Stabilization Program 
 
Unfortunately, Croatian economy has a well documented history of high 
inflation, much longer than its political independence. But, in 1993 
inflation was at its peak. During the first ten month of 1993, the 
average monthly rate exceeded 28%. Therefore, antiinflationary 
measures were an immediate necessity. 
 
The Government announced the Stabilization Program in October 1993 
(see Rohatinski, 1993, Šonje, 1993 and Škreb, 1993). Its immediate 
aim was to swiftly slow down the inflation rate. The Program is 
envisaged to proceed in three, overlapping phases. The first one is 
aimed at achieving rapid disinflation. The second phase comprises of 
structural changes in the economy. They include: speeding up of the 
privatization process, demonopolization of the economy, restructuring 
of loss-making industries like shipbuilding, rehabilitation of the banking 
sector, etc.. The last one should build up sound foundations for 




The first phase, rapid disinflation, relied mostly on the following areas 
(on top of breaking down of inflationary expectations): restrictive 
monetary policy, restrictive fiscal policy, incomes policy and structural 
measures (like introducing internal convertibility of the domestic 
currency and lifting previously numerous foreign exchange controls). 
 
The first stabilization phase has been conceived as a heterodox type of 
antiinflationary measures. Based on the fact that very high inflation 
rates are mostly generated by inflationary expectations, the Program 
diminished them substantially. Since November 1993 (till the end of 
November 1994 - last available data) Croatia experienced a deflation of 
3% (cumulatively) in CPI and about 12% in producer prices indicating 
that the first phase has been very successful. 
 
In a highly inflationary environment, there is a genuine need for 
adjusting the behavior to inflation, which can be done by indexation. 
Indexation is usually done either ex-post, based on monthly consumer 
price indices, or almost on a daily basis by adjusting to changes in the 
exchange rate. Information on the exchange rate data can commonly 
and at very low costs be observed from newspapers. It seems that the 
latter mechanism was very common in Croatia. At the very beginning of 
the implementation of the program, the exchange rate was briefly 
fixed, and later on, as the foreign exchange market started to operate, 
the exchange rate appreciated rather strongly (about 20%). All 
economic transactors were surprised by this occurrence, as everyone 
expected regular depreciations to continue. Through appreciation, not 
only did imported inputs become cheaper, but there was no indication 
of future inflation. So, the strong signalling effect of the exchange rate 
was an important element in diminishing inflationary expectations and 
deflating the inflationary bubble. Other main instruments of 




Permanent currency, the kuna (HRK) was introduced at the end of May 
1994. Croatia had a temporary currency, the Croatian Dinar (HRD) 
since December 1991, when it gained monetary independence, till the 
introduction of a permanent domestic currency. 
 
3.2. Monetary policy changes 
 
It seems that restrictive monetary policy has been essential in the initial 
phase of rapid disinflation in Croatia. To be successful, monetary policy 
had to undergo important changes in the last two years (see for 
example: Martić and Škreb, 1993 Rohatinski, 1993 or Škreb, 1994. 
Changes of obsolete "socialist type of monetary policy instruments" can 
be regarded as a necessary precondition for increasing the efficiency of 
monetary policy tools. 
 
Croatian central bank (called the National Bank of Croatia - NBC) was 
instrumental in achieving changes in monetary policy instruments. 
Croatia has a two-tier banking system. According to the Law on the 
National Bank of Croatia, the Central bank has a high degree of legal 
autonomy. For example, the Governor is elected for a term of six years. 
The National bank is subject to the supervision of the Parliament to 
whom it has to submit its annual report. The National bank has a clear 
mandate to maintain the stability of the currency and to manage 
domestic and external liquidity. Other main functions are: the 
implementation of monetary and foreign exchange policy, banknote 
issue, bank licenses and banking supervision and acting as a lender of 
the last resort. Its policy is coordinated with the Government, but is not 
subordinated to it. 
 
The main changes in monetary policy are: a) at the beginning of 1992 
refinancing window to commercial banks has been limited, namely a 
previously nonexistent ceiling for domestic credits to commercial banks 
was introduced. Beforehand, banks were free to refinance their loans to 
agriculture, exports with the Central bank without any limits, meaning 
that   no   control   of   monetary   aggregates   was   possible;   b)  at 
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the beginning of 1993, the selective refinancing credits have been 
completely phased out; Selective credits represent a refinancing 
window for commercial bank loans earmarked for selective purposes 
like agriculture, shipbuilding, etc. This was a legacy of the socialist 
system and a typical parafiscal (allocative) function of monetary 
authority. On top of their parafiscal role, those credits more often than 
not were heavily subsidized meaning their price was negative in real 
terms. c) general refinancing quotas (meaning not earmarked for 
selective purposes) to commercial banks have been slowly phased out 
and finally dwindled to zero by the end of May 1994 d) domestic credit 
to central government has been legally restricted to 5% of budgetary 
revenues. The government can take only short-term (so called 
"bridging") loans which have to be repaid till the end of the fiscal year, 
thus they do not finance the budget deficit e) a lot of effort is put in 
increasing financial discipline of commercial banks. But, the overall 
financial discipline of the economy in general, including some banks, 
still can be considered too soft. Obviously, increasing financial discipline 
is a lengthy process, and cannot be achieved overnight (for explanation 
see Kornai, 1993b) f) National Bank of Croatia is actively engaged in 
developing financial instruments. Thus, it has introduced the so called 
NBC bills. Their main aim is to sterilize monetary effects of interventions 
on the foreign exchange markets. In a couple of month the amount of 
NBC bills (sold primarily to commercial banks at auctions held twice a 
week) has increased from zero to 8% of the money supply. 
Unfortunately, as yet there is no trading in NBC bills on the secondary 
market (like Money market - Zagreb). g) During the last two years, the 
main instrument of monetary policy were interventions of the National 
Bank on the foreign exchange markets. Throughout 1993 more than 
90% of the increase in monetary base has been caused by monetary 




3.3. Foreign Exchange Reserves and Regulations 
 
With the substantial reduction of refinancing facilities to banks 
(decrease in domestic credits), the primary source of monetary base 
creation have been the monetary effects of foreign exchange 
transactions (increase in net foreign assets in the balance sheet of the 
monetary authorities). During 1992 and 1993 one of the strategic aims 
of monetary policy was building up of foreign exchange reserves. 
Having in mind that international reserves (IMF definition) at the 
National Bank of Croatia were virtually zero at the end of 1991, this aim 
was completely justified. At the end of November 1994 gross 
international reserves reached almost US $ 1,4 billions. 
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How come this substantial increase in international reserves in two 
years? The main causes of foreign exchange inflow seem to be the 
following ones. Households in Croatia traditionally had large foreign 
exchange savings due to developed tourism industry and unilateral 
transfers (remittances) from Croats working in developed countries. In 
an inflationary environment, households kept foreign exchange as a 
store of value and a hedge against inflation. As real wages were halved 
during the last three years, to maintain their "permanent income" 
households exchanged their foreign exchange savings (usually kept 
"under mattresses") for domestic currency to finance their current 
expenditures. Second source of foreign exchange supply were 
commercial banks portfolios. Commercial banks are relatively liquid in 
foreign exchange. It has to be kept in mind that Croatia has temporarily 
suspended its payments to Paris Club and London Club creditors. At the 
end of August 1994 arrears in external debt were important and 
amounted to about US $ 880 million. For commercial banks keeping 
foreign exchange as part of their assets was a good hedge against 
inflation. As the monetary authorities in Croatia started to decline their 
domestic credit activity, commercial banks, more often than not, turned 
to the NBC for their daily liquidity management. Balance of payment 
current account surplus in 1992 and 1993 added to this foreign 
exchange liquidity. 
 
A new Foreign Exchange Law (enacted in October 1993) instituted a 
genuine market for foreign exchange. Buying and selling of foreign 
exchange can be done: a) between authorized commercial (licensed) 
banks and other persons, b) between commercial bariks themselves 
(interbank market) and c) between the National Bank of Croatia and 
commercial banks. 
 
Banks are free to set their exchange rates, meaning that the exchange 
rate of the domestic currency, the kuna, is market-determined. The 
"official" exchange rate of the National Bank of Croatia (used solely for 
accounting purposes like customs) is computed as a weighted average 
of previous day interbank transactions. 
 75
The new Foreign Exchange Law has introduced current account 
convertibility. Croatia will soon be able to accept all obligations coming 
from IMF Article VIII (IMF Article of Agreement). There are still some 
restrictions on the capital account convertibility. It has to be pointed 
out that authorized banks can sell unlimited amounts of foreign 
exchange to natural persons. Households can hold foreign exchange 
savings accounts since mid-sixties and the new Foreign exchange Law 
has enabled legal persons to hold a foreign exchange account (under 
some conditions). 
 
3.4. Fiscal Policy and Incomes Policy 
 
Another pillar of the Stabilization program is fiscal restraint. Fiscal 
sector, especially central budget, has undergone important changes. 
The basic aim in fiscal reform is to decrease the central budget by 
increasing tax revenues and limiting expenditures. For that reason the 
tax system has been transformed. At the beginning of 1994 a new 
Income Tax and Profit Tax were introduced. It is envisaged that the 
Value-Added Tax will be introduced in 1996. A large number of tax 
exemptions have been abolished as well. Tax rate has been broadened, 
and marginal sales tax rates have been lowered. For example, the 
highest marginal income tax rate is 35%. 
 
Much more emphasis is put on control of tax payments to increase 
financial discipline. Customs duties have been lowered as well, but 
exemptions have been severely reduced. Strict control is expected to 
ensure that revenues from customs duties should increase. Subsidies to 
agriculture and other traditionally high budgetary expenditures (like 
shipbuilding) will be lowered. 
 
Central budget revenues for 1994 are estimated at about 28% of the 
(estimated) GDP for that year. Compared to GDP the estimated central 
budget deficit will be negligible. Public sector deficit in 1994 will most 
probably be higher. Public Enterprises and Funds (more specifically 
Pension and Health Fund) have not been fully transformed as yet. 
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Therefore, their deficits will be closely monitored. At this point of time it 
is essential to limit further increase in their deficits. As some relative 
price distortions have been corrected in the past - during hyperinflation 
(like electricity), some public enterprises do not have operational losses 
any more. 
 
Restrictive incomes policies helped to achieve rapid disinflation. At the 
beginning of the Stabilization program the Government has set very 
severe limits on total wage bill of the government controlled sector 
(which represents about two third of the economy) through a set of 
decree laws. Wages in the private sector (enterprises whose equity 
capital is more than 50% privately owned) were not limited. Tight 
incomes policies in the future will most probably be ensured through a 
set of collective bargaining processes between trade unions and the 
Government. This is a very important area of Stabilization program as 
budget constraints are still soft in some areas - like large non-privatized 
companies (as will be explained later on) and a rapid increase in wages 
(above the increase in labor productivity) can easily increase aggregate 
demand, revive inflation and inflationary expectations. 
 
Up till now the costs of the stabilization are few. Unemployment has 
remained stable, industrial production is falling the third consecutive 
year, so the fall cannot be attributed to rapid disinflation, exchange rate 
changes have not had significant effect on foreign trade, number of 
bankruptcies has not increased significantly, etc. Till end of 1994 the 
main negative effects of the stabilization program were: very high real 
credit interest rates (about 18 % on a yearly level). Such high rates can 
deepen the recession. Additionally, we have observed rapid increase in 
interenteprise arrears, which are still manageable, but growing. 
Increased illiquidity of the banking system has shown up as well. It can 
be concluded that up till now the sacrifice ratio has been extremely low. 
But, stabilizing the economy is neither an aim in itself nor is a sufficient 
condition for economic growth. Based on stable macroeconomic 
conditions financial reforms must follow. 
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The changes in the financial system in Croatia, following the country's 
independence, started under very unfavorable macroeconomic 
conditions. Banking sector in Croatia represent the most important 
segment in financial intermediation (like in other transitional 
economies). Hence, it deserves special attention (see Skreb, 1994, and 
Banking in Croatia, 1994.) 
 
3.5. Banking sector 
 
Commercial banks in Croatia detached themselves from the central 
banking system (monobanking) and direct government control in mid-
sixties, considerably much earlier than other ex-Communist countries. 
Banks inherited from the previous system were characterized by a 
strong influence of non-economic, social and political factors. Bad 
assets were quite common. Throughout 1991 and 1992 measures for 
restructuring of the economy and linear bank rehabilitation have been 
passed. They resulted in an improved balance sheet of the overall 
banking system. End 1993 data indicate that about 40% of total banks 
assets in Croatia are claims against central budget. Therefore, at that 
time, capital adequacy ratio has been very high - 18%, way above the 
required minimum of 8%. 
 
The present Croatian banking system comprises some 50 universal 
banks. Concentration is high in the banking industry. Half of the 
banking capital refers to two largest banks both with their headquarters 
in Zagreb. According to end-1993 data, concentration ratio for the four 
largest banks (measured by their assets) was 75% and Hirschmann-
Herfindahl index was 0,1814. 
 
By mid-1994 banks were partially in private ownership, partially owned 
by para-governmental funds, and partially by enterprises whose major 
owner is the Croatian Privatization Fund (CPF). Through the 
privatization process for enterprises ownership structure of banks 
should change as well. But today, the financial position of some large 
banks is still closely linked with the performance of large, sometimes 
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loss-making, enterprises. A series of new private banks, unburdened by 
old dubious operations, but financially quite insignificant, have recently 
been established. 
 
The new Banking Law (enacted in October 1993) envisages an open 
banking market. The Law indicates that banks may be established by 
one legal or physical person, resident or non-resident as joint stock 
companies. Barriers to entry are low as minimum equity capital to 
found a bank is the equivalent of DEM 15 million in domestic currency 
for full international licence. New possibilities have been established for 
issuing working licenses by the NBC (as well as for their withdrawal), 
foreign auditing, internal supervision and central bank authority. A 
number of new rules related to the existing international capital 
adequacy ratio (and other banking supervision coefficients) have been 
introduced as well. 
 
3.6. Other financial institutions 
 
At mid-1994 there were 87 savings banks in Croatia and one 
development bank fully funded by the government (Croatian Credit 
Bank for Reconstruction - HKBO). Savings banks are usually local 
institutions, and their scope of activities is limited in comparisons with 
commercial banks. They are specialized in taking deposits. From the 
beginning of 1995 the activity of savings banks will be supervised by 
the National bank of Croatia and they will be subject to reserve 
requirements as commercial banks today are. There is a large number 
(about 170) of small credit unions and credit cooperatives, but 
financially they are insignificant. 
 
At mid-1994 there were 14 insurance companies operating in Croatia. 
Most of them are small and active only in some areas of the insurance 
business. A large part of the insurance market is restricted to a few of 
insurance companies with one large company still being in a near-
monopoly position. As its equity capital is 85% owned by the state, it is 
obvious that increasing competition and privatization in the insurance 
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market is a priority. Insurance companies usually have relatively large 
financial surpluses and are active (very short therm) lenders on money 
market. 
 
As in other transitional economies, financial structures in Croatia are 
underdeveloped and markets are shallow. There is an interbank money 
market in Zagreb. Money market - Zagreb is a joint stock company 
founded by commercial banks. It is dealing mostly in overnight credits 
(which are automatically granted and repaid the next morning) and 
very short-term credits. The Money market plays an important role in 
daily liquidity management of banks, but the amount of transactions is 
modest. Total average daily turnover (comprising of daily and overnight 
transactions) is about 2-3% of the money supply with overnight 
transactions representing about 80% of the total amount. 
 
The Capital market (Stock exchange - Zagreb) is starting to operate. Its 
role in the economy will probably become more important, once the 
privatization process will be finished. Only a couple of companies' 
shares are quoted and traded in secondary market (which meets twice 
a week). Throughout 1994 Croatian Privatization Fund will use the stock 
exchange as the primary market for privatization (selling) of shares in 
Fund's portfolio. 
 
For the time being both money market and capital market in Croatia 
are underdeveloped. One of the problem is that there are not enough 
securities outstanding to be traded. Therefore, the National Bank of 
Croatia tries to actively enhance its open market operations, which are 
very limited at present. With short-term Government bonds nonexistent 
and other securities very scarce, the NBC bills are the most important 
instrument of indirect money control (as explained before). 
 
Pension fund is managing substantial funds. Its average monthly 
revenues are about 10% of the money supply. Intramonth variations 
are very high with surpluses in the second half of the month and a 
deficit at the beginning of each month. But the Pension fund is not yet 
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an active player on the financial markets. On top of this, the Pension 
fund has gained enterprises shares in the process of ownership 
transformation - privatization. Shares that are not privatized yet are 
distributed among Croatian Privatization Fund, Pension fund and Health 
fund. Thus, the Pension fund has a diversified portfolio, but is not 
active on the Stock exchange either. This can be attributed both to 
undeveloped financial markets, high uncertainty and lack of human 
capital. 
 
3.7. Cooperation with International Financial Organizations 
 
Croatia is a fully fledged member of the: International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), World Bank Group (IBRD, IFC, IDA, MIGA), European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and some other institutions. 
This mere fact is a necessary condition for becoming a part of 
international financial market. Croatia's external debt of about US $ 2,6 
billion is not considered excessive. Croatian debtors are in the process 
of reconciling their relationships with foreign creditors, notably the Paris 
Club country members and London Club commercial banks. It is 
expected that the approved stand-by/systemic transformation facility 
with the IMF in October 1994, will mean a clear signal to other 
organizations that they should be more active in Croatia. The World 
bank and the European bank for Reconstruction and Development have 
approved loans to Croatia in 1994. 
 
Financial reforms look like an additional (on top of low inflation - stable 
macroeconomic conditions) necessary condition for speeding up of 
growth rates in the economy. Bold financial reforms are necessary to 
proceed with meaningful transformation of the real sector. 
 
4. Future prospects and problems ahead 
 
Having in mind difficult conditions for transition in Croatia, one could 
argue that a lot has been accomplished already. But, there are 
problems that still have to be resolved. They will be briefly explained. 
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The state has emerged, directly or through the CPF, as the largest 
single owner in the economy. It is estimated that more than 2/3 of the 
economy is still under state control. The share of private ownership 
must be increased and the role of the state as a major owner, or 
manager, in the economy reduced. Through privatization, the efficiency 
of the markets should increase. 
 
Further reforms, aimed at changing the behavior in the economy by 
imposing hard budget constraints (increasing financial discipline) and 
optimizing resource allocation, especially in large loss-making still state-
controlled enterprises are urgent. It is amazing to see how vested 
interests are deeply rooted. Microeconomic restructuring is something 
that we have to be confronted with on the winding road of 
transformation to a market economy. To achieve this goal organizing an 
efficient payment system, necessary for good financial intermediation is 
a prerequisite. Rules for exit out of the market must me simplified and 
the process speeded up. 
 
Rehabilitation of banks is high on the agenda. Large banks are 
burdened with consequences of previous bad loans. The Croatian 
Government has already recapitalized banks. More than 40% of banks' 
total assets are claims on Central Government (public debt). Part of the 
remaining banks assets can be classified as non-performing loans. 
Therefore, some banks are faced with severe liquidity problems. As, out 
of 50 banks, 25 are state controlled it is no surprise that moral hazard 
problem is common in the behavior of their management. Banks in 
Croatia are of- universal type, therefore risks are high and strict control 
is required. Supervision of banks (and savings banks) must be 
ameliorated. Banks' role in the allocation of capital is very important in 
Croatia's system. Therefore, a viable banking system is a prerequisite 
for speedier growth. 
 
Another question is how to increase the quality of the state and 
minimize state failures. It is obvious that the role of the state in 
transition is prominent (see Bićanić and Škreb, 1992). The state can 
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either stimulate further reforms or can block them completely. Neither 
the state nor the domestic private sector alone can accomplish all the 
tasks of transformation, least accomplish them efficiently. 
 
But, one of the greatest obstacles to rapid transformation lies in the 
minds of some people. It is sometimes difficult to realize that the 
philosophy of the market is the philosophy of constant threat of failure. 
Therefore, bankruptcies must become a common reality. Simple and 
clear rules for exit from the market are necessary for greater financial 
discipline. Enterprises must realize that the state will not bail them out 
on every occasion that they fail. Management of banks must 
understand that they will not be bailed out unconditionally and as many 
times as necessary. 
 
Financial discipline cannot be achieved overnight and probably takes a 
longer period of time. Increasing financial discipline requires long 
preparations for the government to change the rules of the game and 
time period for economic transactor to adapt to the new rules. 
Learning-by-doing seem to be slow. Credibility of government 
willingness is essential here (see Kornai, 1993b). 
 
The success of transition does not rely solely on the country involved 
(Croatia in this case). Foreign help can be an important element in the 
transformation process. Opening up of international markets is probably 
the most important single factor which will help transitional economies 
in their restructuring and sustained growth. Financial assistance is 
another significant element. For example it can secure an adequate 
social safety net and facilitate transformation. We have repeatedly 
pointed out that privatization is a necessary condition for efficient 
markets. With the lack of domestic savings, the role of foreign capital 
(in equity) is prominent. Domestic private sector is booming, but it is 
increasingly difficult for private firms to cope with difficulties of start-up. 
Transfer of know-how is not just transfer of know-how in modern 
production or information technologies, but an efficient help in 
establishing institutional underpinnings for financial markets. 
 83
Foreign help to economies in transformation should not be regarded as 
charity, but the most efficient way to increase globalization of world 
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